The United States convicts over 1 million people of felonies each year without affording the resources of a trial. Instead, these convictions are attained by guilty plea. The current research investigated the similarities and differences that would emerge between pleas and confessions when relying on a paradigm originally developed for confession research. The study employed a modified cheating paradigm with a 2 (innocent or guilty) ϫ 2 (plea or confession) ϫ 2 (evidence-bluff or no-bluff) between-participants design. We hypothesized that the evidence-bluff manipulation, which involves telling participants that there is potentially diagnostic evidence that has yet to be tested, would increase false confessions (Perillo & Kassin, 2011) , but decrease false guilty pleas. The bluff manipulation should strengthen the phenomenology of innocence, which will lead the innocent to believe their confession poses no threat, but that a guilty plea would eliminate their hope of being found innocent. Although the hypothesized interaction between the evidence-bluff and plea-confession conditions on acceptance outcomes did not materialize, other evidence emerged indicating that pleas and confessions might involve different underlying processes. Specifically, innocent participants gave different reasons for refusing to sign a plea statement than they did for refusing to sign a confession statement. Similarly, the plea and confession conditions prompted guilty participants to provide significantly different reasons for agreeing to sign the statement. In conclusion, the current research provides some support for the psychological differences between pleas and confessions, while also highlighting the need for new paradigms that are specifically designed to study plea decision making.
Over one million plea convictions are recorded each year (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007) . The nationwide rise in guilty pleas began in the 1980s and continues to escalate (Oppel, 2011) ; the most recent report indicated that 97.4% of federal cases concluded with a guilty plea (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015) . The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged this upward trend describing our current criminal justice system as "a system of pleas" (Lafler v. Cooper, 2012, p. 11 ). Yet, psycho-legal research has largely failed to keep pace with plea-bargaining's domination of the justice system (Redlich, 2010a) . The limited research on pleas is attributable to many factors. One such factor could be the overlap between plea and confession research-specifically, recent experimental studies on pleas and confessions have relied on similar manipulations and paradigms (Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Henderson, 2016; Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005; Wilford & Wells, under revision) . This overlap is justified by the characteristics that interrogations and plea negotiations share. Both situations involve an authority figure pressuring a defendant to sign a legal document. Thus, the current research will employ an adapted cheating paradigm to determine the differences and similarities that emerge when pleas and confessions are evaluated within the same study.
What is a Plea?
Guilty pleas typically result from plea bargains. Prosecutors usually initiate this process by offering defendants leniency in exchange for their willingness to forgo trial (Fisher, 2000) . Leniency can include sentence discounts, charge reductions, and even fact-bargaining (e.g., agreeing that the defendant's role in a criminal conspiracy was limited; Covey, 2008) . After both parties agree to a plea deal, the agreement is presented to a judge as part of a plea colloquy (Redlich & Bonventre, 2015) . Judges must approve the terms of the plea, and ensure that it is entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (Redlich & Summers, 2012) .
Notably, before the plea colloquy, prosecutors can alter the terms of a plea offer even after the defense has accepted. Judges also have the authority to reject the terms of a plea, after which defendants could choose to proceed to trial. Regardless of how a plea offer might evolve, there can be no ambiguity regarding the charges to which the defendant is pleading once the conviction has been recorded. Otherwise, the judge could not affirm that the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. These requirements have been bolstered by cases wherein plea convictions have been overturned because defendants were not adequately informed of the consequences (i.e., deportation) of their decision to plead (Jae Lee v. United States, 2017; Padilla v. Kentucky, 2010) . During the plea colloquy, the court must also establish a factual basis of guilt, though the defendant's guilty plea can be considered evidence toward this end (Eisen & Rooney, 2002; Redlich & Ozdogru, 2009 ).
Plea and Confession Similarities Situational Factors
Plea negotiations occur in a context that shares a number of similarities with interrogations. In both situations, a State representative (a prosecutor or law enforcement official) is attempting to secure a statement from suspects. In interrogations, officials request a signed or recorded confession; in plea negotiations, attorneys request a plea agreement. Given the similarities, it should be no surprise that real-stakes experiments examining confessions as well as plea bargains have relied on similar paradigms and manipulations (i.e., the cheating paradigm; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Russano et al., 2005; Wilford & Wells, under revision) . Further, methods to secure both pleas and confessions have elicited concerns that the processes are unduly coercive and could contribute to convictions of not just the guilty, but the innocent (Fisher, 2000; Kassin et al., 2010) . Relatedly, many scholars believe that the number of cases involving false confessions and false guilty pleas is vastly underestimated (Redlich, 2010a (Redlich, , 2010b . Documented cases of both are difficult to discover and verify. Yet, the number of confirmed false guilty pleas has continued to increase, accounting for 15% of wrongful convictions since 1989 (National Registry of Exonerations, 2015a) . False confessions were a factor in ϳ13% of cases in the same period (National Registry of Exonerations, 2017).
Impact on Probability of Conviction
Further, both pleas and confessions are damning to a defense. Plea deals, by their very definition, guarantee a conviction outcome. False confessions, although not legally equivalent to convictions, are associated with a high likelihood of conviction (Kassin, 2008 (Kassin, , 2012 . Investigators will often overlook evidence that contradicts a confession, furthering their belief that the suspect who confessed is guilty (Martin, 2011) . In one such case, the district attorney responded to exonerating DNA evidence by stating that ". . . I know because I trust my detective and my tape-recorded confession. Therefore, the results [of the DNA test] must be flawed until someone proves to me otherwise" (Kassin, 2012, p. 433) . Even in the face of mismatched DNA, the perceived veracity of this confession could not be toppled. In summary, while pleas are convictions, confessions are often as good as convictions; further, interrogations and plea negotiations share a number of situational factors, leading researchers to adopt similar experimental paradigms with which to study them.
Plea and Confession Differences

Time of Occurrence
Pleas and confessions have their differences as well. Perhaps most importantly, pleas and confessions occur at different times during the investigatory process. When defendants are faced with the decision to plead, a number of complex factors could have emerged that had yet to develop at the time of an interrogation. Days, weeks, even years could pass between a confession and a plea offer, and the former will always precede the latter. At the time of an interrogation, the defendant will possess less information and will be less likely to have secured an attorney than at the time plea negotiations occur. Further, due to their order of occurrence, confessions can increase the likelihood of pleas, but not vice versa. In fact, research has shown that cases in which a defendant confesses are more likely to be resolved with a plea deal (Kassin, 2012; National Registry of Exonerations, 2015b; Redlich, 2010a) .
Actual Admissions
Confessions naturally include some form of guilt admission, but pleas do not constitutionally require any admission of guilt (Hudson v. United States, 1926; North Carolina v. Alford, 1970) . Two types of plea deals can be entered and accepted by the State without a confession: nolo contendere pleas allow defendants to accept a plea conviction without making any statements as to their guilt or innocence; Alford pleas allow defendants to explicitly assert their innocence while accepting a plea conviction (Redlich & Ozdogru, 2009 ).
Evidence Versus Conviction
Although confessions are often damning evidence, confessors have not yet been convicted. Guilty pleas are a method of conviction whereas confessions are a type of evidence (National Registry of Exonerations, 2015b). Confessors can still demand trials, thereby requiring the State to continue investigations and seek further evidence (though confessions can bias those investigations; Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner, 2012) . In contrast, those who accept a plea are accepting that any evidence, including exculpatory evidence, that has not yet been discovered or tested will most likely remain undiscovered or untested; especially being that without police intervention to preserve evidence, most of it will naturally decay (e.g., witness memory, biological samples, etc.). Because of the consequences of a plea conviction, legal procedures also require defendants to reiterate their plea several times. After agreeing to a plea offer, they have to restate their willingness to plead in front of a judge (often repeatedly); if they do not reenter their plea in front of a judge, the initial agreement is unenforceable. In contrast, once suspects have confessed, subsequent denials do little to reduce the power of that confession (Kassin, 2012) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Decision Models
Plea deals represent a choice between a known outcome and a probabilistic outcome. In contrast, the decision to confess involves no explicitly known outcomes. Whereas plea deals are predicated on a promise of leniency, confessions elicited through such offers are usually judged inadmissible (Russano et al., 2005) . The ambiguity in confession outcomes render them somewhat incompatible with traditional models of decision-making (e.g., Expected Utility Theory, Prospect Theory). Thus, a number of researchers have theorized new models that are unique to the confession decision (Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Yang, Guyll, & Madon, 2017) .
Plea decision models. Pleas involve a choice between two explicitly articulated outcomes: Option A: certain punishment; or, Option B: uncertain punishment that, if it occurs, is worse than Option A. Given these parameters, decision-making models predict that people will tend to behave in ways that maximize expected utility (probability of the outcome [conviction] multiplied by the value of the outcome [plea discount]; Bibas, 2004) . However, other factors can play a role, such as the decision-maker's frame of reference in terms of whether the situation is one of gain or one of loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . According to Prospect Theory, people are risk averse when problems are framed in terms of gains, and risk seeking when equivalent problems are framed in terms of losses. At this point, it is unclear how plea offers are perceived in terms of gains versus losses and that is not the purpose of the current research. Our point is that decisionmaking models that pit certain outcomes against uncertain outcomes potentially fit the decision-process structure involved in plea decisions (Wilford & Wells, under revision) , but seem distant and ill-fitting for decisions to confess.
Confession decision models. Models of confession decisionmaking involve more ambiguity than do plea decision models. Although these models have also relied on suspects' perceptions of the potential utility (consequences) of confessing, the variables that impact these perceptions are more dynamic in confession models (Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Houston, Meissner, & Evans, 2014; Yang et al., 2017) . The act of confessing is often perceived as providing immediate relief from unpleasant proximal consequences (i.e., stressful interrogation environment) despite the increased risk of unpleasant distal consequences (Kassin et al., 2010) . Whereas pleas can also provide a form of immediate relief for a subset of those who are in jail (because they were denied or could not afford bail), this form of relief is less common and is also quickly joined by the other consequences of pleading (e.g., parole, community service, etc.). Thus, the decision to confess pits unknown proximal outcomes against unknown distal outcomes (as opposed to pitting certain outcomes against uncertain outcomes). Research has shown that the proximity of confession outcomes has a measurable impact on their perceived utility (Madon, Guyll, Scherr, Greathouse, & Wells, 2012) . Further, variables that impact either the perceived utility of the proximal or distal consequences of confessing impact the overall probability of a confession (Madon, Yang, Smalarz, Guyll, & Scherr, 2013; Yang, Madon, & Guyll, 2015) . These factors have been incorporated into a new interrogation decision-making model that can integrate myriad potential predictive factors affecting the utility of each decision outcome (e.g., length of interrogation, interrogation techniques, presentation of [true and false] evidence, interrogation environment, etc.), that change as the interrogation continues (Yang et al., 2017) . Other models have focused on how motivations for true versus false confessions might differ; specifically, Houston et al. (2014) found converging evidence that true confessions might be more internally motivated (e.g., remorse, guilt, etc.), whereas false confessions are driven more by external factors (e.g., interrogation methods, social pressures, etc.). In summary, while traditional models of decision-making can be applicable to the plea decision, the decision to confess involves a number of unique situational factors that call for a distinct model of decision making.
Phenomenological Experience
Confession researchers have long posited that one of the greatest menaces to the legal decision-making of the innocent is innocence itself (Kassin, 2005) . Innocent people can perceive their innocence as a shield that will protect them from conviction-this bias has been termed the phenomenology of innocence. The phenomenological experience of an innocent person is qualitatively different than the phenomenological experience of a guilty person. Consequently, innocent individuals can be biased toward believing that the outcome of a legal investigation will reveal their innocence. This bias can lead them to be too willing to waive their rights, or otherwise submit to investigative procedures that are not in their best interest (e.g., interrogation, inclusion in lineup; Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Kassin, 2005, respectively) .
The phenomenology of innocence can even lead the innocent to falsely confess (Kassin, 2005) . In one experiment, Perillo and Kassin (2011) found that an evidence-"bluff" substantially increased false confessions. This manipulation was designed to mimic real-world interrogations in which investigators fabricate potentially diagnostic evidence (that could reveal the defendants' innocence or guilt) that has yet to be tested; the technique is aimed at sweating out the guilty, motivating them to cooperate. For instance, an investigator might tell a suspect that DNA was found at the crime scene, and that the results of the testing could be released at any moment-thus, it is in the best interest of the suspect to cooperate immediately. The results indicated that the bluff manipulation had little impact on the guilty, but greatly increased false confessions among the innocent. To the innocent, confessing makes sense in this scenario, because it ends the noxious interrogation, and (in their view) the evidence will ultimately prove their innocence.
Interestingly, however, an evidence bluff could, theoretically, have the opposite effect on the decision to accept a plea among the innocent. This is because the decision to plead largely halts the investigation, which could prevent the bluffed evidence from being revealed. Importantly, a bluff manipulation could not be employed during real-world plea negotiations. Legal actors cannot fabricate evidence when attempting to secure guilty pleas. In fact, the Brady rule requires that the prosecution disclose the existence of any evidence favorable to the defense (Brady v. Maryland, 1963) , though this evidence does not necessarily need to be shared until trial (the required timing varies by jurisdiction; Schwartzapfel, 2017) . Instead, defendants can choose to reject or defer plea offers until existing evidence is tested or reviewed, or accept a plea knowing that review or testing would be unlikely to proceed thereafter. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Studying Pleas and Confessions
Despite numerous differences between pleas and confessions, studies on both of these phenomena have relied on similar research methods. Although these methods capture important situational characteristics of both scenarios, they also ignore potentially critical differences between these two processes that could not be easily captured by existing research paradigms. Specifically, the cheating paradigm could not incorporate the differences in the timing of these two procedures without dramatic alterations. It would be very difficult (and potentially unethical) to accuse students of academic dishonesty, attempt to secure a confession from them, send them home for some period of time, and then offer them a discounted sanction in exchange for their decision to forgo a disciplinary hearing. Instead, plea studies typically abbreviate this process by accusing students of academic dishonesty and then offering them a discounted sanction (with no interrogation). This method still honors some of the differences between pleas and confessions, but it cannot account for them all. Further, it is unclear whether the omission of added time between the accusation and plea offer makes the plea request feel more like a confession request (from the participants' perspective). In summary, it is unclear how using similar procedures could be clouding the potential differences between pleas and confessions.
The Current Research
The current research was aimed at determining the similarities and differences that emerge between pleas and confessions when relying on experimental methods adapted from confession research. This was the first experiment to examine both plea and confession behaviors within the same study. We used a modified cheating paradigm (Russano et al., 2005) as well as an adaptation of Perillo and Kassin's (2011) evidence-bluff manipulation. After participants were accused of cheating, they were asked either to sign a confession or accept a plea deal. The plea deal asked participants to agree to work in the research lab for 20 hrs over the next 4 weeks (Wilford & Wells, under revision) . In addition, some participants were presented with an evidence-bluff whereas others received no bluff. The evidence-bluff manipulation involved telling participants that a hidden camera had recorded the problemsolving portion of the study and could reveal whether they had cheated (Perillo & Kassin, 2011) . Although even a modified cheating paradigm cannot capture all the qualities of plea bargaining (e.g., timing), as an exploratory study we felt it was important to replicate previous plea and confession studies as closely as possible. We predicted that innocent participants would be more likely to falsely confess in the bluff than in the no-bluff condition (replicating Perillo & Kassin, 2011) , but that innocent participants offered a plea would be less likely to plead in the bluff than in the no-bluff condition. Given the novelty of the current study, we did not make strong a priori predictions regarding the similarities that might emerge as a result of the similarities in the study methodology. As this was the first study to examine pleas and confessions within the same experiment, we also included a number of other measures to examine the similarities and differences between these conditions.
Method Participants
There were 422 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory courses at a large Midwestern university who participated in this experiment in exchange for two research credits. All participants had to be native English speakers and be 18 years of age or older; 233 of the participants were female (55.2%). The mean age was 19.3 years with a range of 18 to 51 years of age. All participants were treated in accordance with American Psychological Association (APA) ethical guidelines.
Design
This study used a 2 (guilt status: innocent or guilty) ϫ 2 (statement type: confession or plea) ϫ 2 (bluff: evidence-bluff or no-bluff) between-participants design. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions.
Materials
All experimenters were required to attend three 1-to 1.5-hr training sessions led by Miko M. Wilford. Experimenters were provided with detailed scripts to ensure the manipulations were administered accurately and consistently. Elements of the study script were adapted from previous research (Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Russano et al., 2005; Wilford & Wells, under revision) . A copy of the full script is available in the supplemental materials linked to this article.
The study also used a number of paper measures including problem-solving packets and questionnaires. The questionnaires included individual difference measures both to further support the experiment's purported purpose, and to examine potential predictor variables in the future (by aggregating data across plea studies; Wilford & Wells, under revision) .
1 Among the individual difference measures were the: Global Belief in a Just World Scale (Lipkus, 1991) , Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) , Big Five-Aspect Scale (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007) , and the Private Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) . Participants were also asked a number of demographic questions measuring their political associations, ACT scores, level of intended academic achievement, and so forth.
Procedure
All participants were recruited for a study called, "Problem Solving with Personality." The study description claimed that the researchers were interested in examining how people with varying personalities solve problems individually and in pairs. Upon arriving to the research lab, participants were introduced to a confederate who posed as another participant. Participants began by completing an initial demographic and personality questionnaire after which the experimenter asked that they engage in a rapportbuilding session with confederates. Experimenters claimed the rapport-building would increase the validity of the study being that complete strangers rarely solve problems together. Of course, the actual function of this rapport was to better ensure that participants would cooperate with confederates' later requests for help (if participants were randomly assigned to a guilty condition). At this time, the experimenter left the room for 3 min. Confederates were instructed to be especially friendly, and to maintain conversation for the entire rapport session.
Experimenters returned with three logic-problem packets-two were marked as individual and one was marked team problems. Each packet contained two open-ended problems. Experimenters told participants that individual problems were to be solved alone and team problems were to be solved together. After experimenters answered any questions, they left the room again. Participants in the guilty conditions were induced by the confederate to cheat on the second individual problem-hereafter referred to as the triangle problem. Confederates would begin by expressing difficulty with the problem, eventually asking participants assigned to the guilty condition what answer they wrote down. Participants who refused to provide their answer were asked up to two more times (never exceeding three total requests). Only participants who cooperated with the confederates' requests to share their answer on this problem were considered guilty. If participants did not actually share their answer (despite the confederates' requests), their responses were excluded from subsequent analyses. Confederates never asked participants in the innocent conditions for help on individual problems.
Experimenters collected the logic-problem packets stating that they would be scored while the next personality questionnaire was completed. Experimenters returned reporting a problem that required them to speak to the participants separately. The confederate was led away first; 3 min later, the experimenter returned with the confederate and led the participant to another room. Experimenters explained that an issue arose during the scoring of the logic problems; namely, the participant and the confederate had the same wrong answer on the triangle problem. This event was presented as being extremely statistically unlikely without collusion on the problem. Experimenters then reported uncertainty regarding how to proceed, which had prompted them to contact the professor in charge of the study. Experimenters explained that the professor sounded pretty upset and thought the case might require a review by the Department of Psychology Human Research Ethics Review-a (made-up) committee created to handle cheating when it occurs in research studies. The next phase of the study differed by condition.
In evidence-bluff conditions, participants were told that potentially exonerating or damning evidence existed (adapted from Perillo & Kassin, 2011): My professor reminded me that there is a hidden camera set up in the other room that recorded the whole session. It could reveal whether you cheated or didn't cheat. The video is automated and only exists for security reasons. Because, I guess the lab had a break-in last year or something. Unfortunately, the camera feeds directly into a locked server that records video, but is limited to a 24-hr loop due to data storage limitations. This server is only accessible by an off-campus security firm . . . Importantly, the evidence-bluff manipulation was altered slightly between confession and plea conditions. To mimic realworld procedures, participants in the confession conditions were told that the professor was already in the process of contacting the security firm to secure the video. They were told that regardless of what they decided, the professor would save the video to turn it over to the Human Research Ethics Review. Participants in the plea conditions were told that if they chose to accept the plea, the professor would not go to the trouble of saving the video. By accepting the plea, they were essentially ending the matter and signaling that no further investigation was necessary. They were also reminded that if the professor did not save the video, it would be erased within 24 hr (because the server records on a continuous loop that is limited to a 24-hr cycle). This difference accurately mimics real-life situations in which a confession does not end an investigation. After securing a confession, investigators have to continue pursuing evidence to try the suspect. When a plea is accepted, however, the investigation is over and no other evidence is gathered or evaluated.
Experimenters then provided participants with one of two handwritten statements to sign. In the confession conditions, participants were presented with this statement:
I admit to having shared answers on the individual triangle problem in the Problem-Solving with Personality study.
In the plea conditions, participants were instead presented with this statement:
I, name of participant, agree to work 20 hr on the Problem Solving with Personality study by one month after that day's date.
If participants did not initially sign the statement, experimenters requested that they sign up to two more times. Experimenters then left again stating that the professor had to be updated. Later, experimenters requested that the participant answer a few more questions about the cheating accusation so that the professor could be completely informed of the situation. Experimenters then completed a funnel debriefing in which the participants were gauged for suspicion while the study's true objectives were gradually revealed. This process included questions regarding the study's true purpose as well as questions prompting participants to reveal whether they (at different times during the study) thought elements might be staged. During this process, participants were also asked a few questions regarding their perceptions of the consequences the situation posed.
Results
Data from 94 of the 422 participants (22.2%) had to be excluded from all subsequent analyses. Participants' data were most commonly excluded because of suspicion. The exclusion criteria for suspicion were participants who: (a) reported that the confederateparticipant was part of the experiment, or (b) stated the study's true purpose was centered around whether people would sign a statement after an accusation (rather than problem-solving, as the study description and experimenter claimed). Forty-six participants (10.9%) met one or both of these criteria-a proportion that has greatly increased from our previous plea studies (see Wilford & Wells, under revision, Experiment 1 Յ 5.0% and Experiment 2 Ͻ 1.0%). Unfortunately, the growing exposure of the cheating paradigm to undergraduate students (in classes as well as other research labs) led to higher levels of suspicion in the participant This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
pool. It is possible that other participants were aware of the deception yet did not reveal their suspicions, but the debriefing provided several opportunities for participants to admit their suspicions (including a multiple-choice question in which several options allowed them to indicate that they thought or knew the study was staged). Further, there was no cost to participants to admit their suspicions. Data from another 20 participants (4.7%) were excluded because of early suspension of the study session-sessions were suspended early when participants exhibited excessive emotional distress. Another 10 participants' (2.4%) data were disqualified because they did not comport to their randomly assigned conditions; specifically, some guilty people refused to share their answer with the confederate, and a couple innocent people cheated (i.e., the confederate noticed them clearly looking over at his or her responses to individual problems). Thus, participants' guilt status (in subsequent analyses) depended both on the condition to which they were assigned as well as whether their behavior was consistent with that condition. Data from another eight participants (1.9%) were omitted after they reported having prior knowledge of the study protocol. An additional eight participants (1.9%) were excluded after making statements that contradicted an important aspect of the bluff manipulation, which showed that they did not listen to or comprehend the experimenter's comments. The final two participants were omitted because one did not fulfill the requirements of study participation, and the other was exposed to an experimenter error (0.5%). After these necessary exclusions, the final sample size was N ϭ 328 with a range of n ϭ 38 to 43 participants per cell.
Plea and Confession Outcomes
We initially tested for potential main effects and interactions by conducting a binary hierarchical logistic regression on plea outcomes, which incorporated all three of the dependent variables (i.e., guilt status, statement type, and bluff). Main effects were entered on the first block, two-way interactions on the second, and the three-way interaction was entered on the third and final block. Only the two-way interaction between guilt status and the pleaconfession condition was significant, B ϭ Ϫ1.37, SE ϭ 0.54, Wald's 2 (1) ϭ 6.43, p ϭ .011, e B ϭ 0.25 (95% confidence interval, CI [0.08, 0.73]); the remaining interactions were not significant, Bs Ͻ 0.72, SEs Ͼ 1.08, Wald's 2 (1) Ͻ 1.88, ps Յ .92. The pattern of the interaction indicates that the guilt-status manipulation had a larger impact on those in the confession condition than those in the plea condition. Only guilt status produced a significant main effect. Guilty participants were more likely to sign both the confession and plea deal than innocent participants, 
Reasons for Signing the Confession or Plea Deal
Given the importance of revealing the similarities and differences between plea and confession behaviors, we included measures that could illuminate the factors that led participants to accept or reject plea deals versus factors that led participants to Note. The percent appears in parentheses (n); the confidence intervals for each proportion appear in brackets. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
accept or reject confession statements. Thus, after the experimenter returned from calling the professor to report what had happened during the accusation phase of the study (i.e., whether the participant had agreed to accept the plea deal or sign the confession), participants were asked to report their reasons for signing or refusing to sign the plea or confession statement. All participants were asked the question in an open-ended format. The wording only differed with regard to framing the question according to whether they agreed or refused to sign the statement written out for them. Consequently, the results will be presented separately for participants who were asked why they agreed to sign the statement versus participants who were asked why they refused (refer to Table 2 and Table 3 , respectively). All of the reasons participants provided for signing or refusing to sign the statement were coded into one of several categories. The initial categories were identified by relying on previous research (Bordens & Bassett, 1985; Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Wilford & Wells, under revision; Yang et al., 2017) , and were expanded based on an initial examination of the responses. Coders were also encouraged to identify any new categories that they felt were not represented. Nine categories were identified among reasons for signing the statement (plea or confession). Another nine categories were identified among reasons for refusing to sign the statement. Each response was coded by two independent coders. Because there were several potential coders for each response, an intraclass correlation (ICC) was taken relying on single (not average) measures between Coder 1 and Coder 2. The ICC was 0.85 [95% CI: .81, .89] for coded responses regarding why participants agreed to sign the statement they were offered, F (193, 194) To conduct an omnibus 2 analysis, categories with expected count totals less than five had to be collapsed into a "Miscellaneous" category. The top five reasons guilty participants provided for accepting the plea or confession were preserved, and all others were added to Miscellaneous responses. Among the guilty, responses provided for signing the statement varied significantly by plea and confession conditions, 2 (5, N ϭ 134) ϭ 53.00, p Ͻ .001. Among the innocent, responses for signing the statement did not vary significantly, 2 (2, N ϭ 60) ϭ 0.45, p ϭ .798. Note, however, that the number of innocent participants who accepted the statement was dramatically lower (N ϭ 60) than the number of innocent participants who rejected the statement (N ϭ 134) thereby limiting the potential for a significant value.
Reasons for Rejecting the Confession or Plea Deal
Participants who refused to sign the confession or plea deal were asked to provide reasons for their refusal in an open-ended format. Again, responses with expected count totals less than five were collapsed into the Miscellaneous category. The reasons produced by innocent participants for refusing to sign the statement in plea versus confession conditions varied significantly, 2 (3, N ϭ 101) ϭ 13.80, p ϭ .003. The reasons for refusal did not differ significantly among the guilty, 2 (1, N ϭ 31) ϭ 1.55, p ϭ .214. Though again, the number of participants included in each of the analyses was dramatically different because of the higher proportion of guilty participants signing the statement. Overall, these findings provide some evidence that the factors driving plea and confession outcomes differ.
Video Data
A hidden camera recorded the study from the time at which the experimenter led participants to a separate room to the study's conclusion. The videos were then reviewed to record the number of admissions, denials, and questions produced by each participant. Video data were recorded for exploratory purposes; we did not have any a priori hypotheses regarding what these recordings would reveal. Instead, we believed they could illuminate other ways in which the decision to confess versus the decision to plead is approached. Video coders were blind to the guilt status of the participant, but could not be blind to the statement type and bluff manipulations as they were presented within the video-recorded phase of the study. Given the relatively objective nature of the data recorded (i.e., frequencies), we did not feel the visibility of the manipulations would be particularly problematic, but we still acknowledge this as a limitation of the coding process. Because of the limited and mixed impact of the bluff manipulation, all of the subsequent analyses collapse across that condition.
Results indicated that innocent individuals (M ϭ 2.73, SD ϭ 2.22) produced more denials than guilty individuals (M ϭ 0.81, Note. The % frequency of reasons provided for acceptance of the plea deal or confession among the guilty versus the innocent research participants. The number (n) of participants providing each reason appears in parentheses. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. (Wilford & Wells, under revision) . Given our interest in distinguishing pleas from confessions, we also conducted analyses comparing the responses of innocent and guilty individuals in each statement-type condition. Innocent participants in the confession condition (M ϭ 3.19, SD ϭ 2.45) produced more denials than innocent participants in the plea condition (M ϭ 2.27, SD ϭ 1.87), t (156) 
Final Questions
During the debriefing process, participants were asked a number of postaccusation questions as the study deception was gradually unveiled. Some of these questions were designed to provide additional opportunities to assess the participants' suspicion of the study manipulations. Another nine questions were included to further examine the potential differences between pleas and confessions.
2 First, participants were asked to rate the severity of the consequences of not signing the statement on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all severe) to 5 (very severe). Participants in the plea conditions rated the consequences of not signing as more severe than those in the confession conditions, t(320) ϭ Ϫ4.22, M 1 Ϫ M 2 ϭ Ϫ0.60, 95% CI [Ϫ0.88, Ϫ0.32], p Ͻ .001. Experimenters then asked subjects to rate the severity of the consequences of signing. Here, participants in the confession condition rated the consequences of signing as more severe than those in the plea condition, t(323) ϭ Ϫ3.68, M 1 Ϫ M 2 ϭ 0.47, 95% CI [0.22, 0.71], p Ͻ .001. Participants were then asked to rate their willingness to sign the statement on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all willing) to 7 (totally willing). The plea versus confession manipulation had no significant impact on willingness to sign the statement, t(324) ϭ 0.04, M 1 Ϫ M 2 ϭ 0.01, 95% CI [Ϫ0.34, 0.35], p ϭ .971. Similarly, nonsignificant effects were found when comparing participants' perceptions of the strength and plausibility of the evidence against them, as well as how trapped participants felt by the plea versus confession statements.
One of the final postaccusation questions asked participants how frightened they were by the consequences of not agreeing to sign the statement. Participants in the plea condition were more frightened by the consequences of not signing than those in the confession condition, t(323) ϭ Ϫ2.88, M 1 Ϫ M 2 ϭ Ϫ0.48, 95% CI [Ϫ0.80, Ϫ0.15], p ϭ .004. However, given the time at which these questions were asked (during debriefing) as well as the number of questions that were asked, these results must be interpreted with caution. That said, the significance of these three combined effects does seem to indicate that the plea situation is perceived differently than the confession situation. Specifically, participants in the plea conditions were able to compare the potential consequences of not signing the statement with the consequences of signing the statement. These comparisons appeared to alter their perceptions such that the consequences of not signing were perceived as relatively worse and more frightening. Note. The % frequency of reasons provided for rejection of the plea deal and confession among the guilty versus the innocent research participants. The number (n) of participants providing each reason appears in parentheses.
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Discussion
The current results provide a replication of previous studies using the cheating paradigm to investigate plea bargains. Specifically, with a false plea rate of 40.7% (collapsing across bluff conditions), this is the third real-stakes study to record a false-plea rate nearing (or exceeding) 50% (Dervan & Edkins, 2013: 56.4%; Wilford & Wells, under revision, Experiment 1: 52.1%, Experiment 2: 58.1%; see Gregory, Mowen, & Linder, 1978 , Experiment 2 for an exception, though with only 16 participants). The true plea rate of 73.8% was also comparable with previous real-stakes research (Dervan & Edkins, 2013: 89.2%; Gregory et al. (1978) , Experiment 2: 75.0%; Wilford & Wells, under revision, Experiment 1: 80.3%, Experiment 2: 80.2%). This research also provided the first direct comparison of pleas and confessions, which have relied on similar experimental paradigms. By randomly assigning participants to either a plea or a confession condition, we were able to investigate potential differences between these two experimental scenarios.
The Bluff
Unfortunately, the impact of the evidence-bluff manipulation was muted. We had hypothesized that while the evidence-bluff would decrease the innocent's resistance to falsely confess, it would have the opposite effect on their propensity to accept a plea deal. Although the evidence-bluff did increase the proportion of innocent participants who signed the confession statement, the effect did not achieve significance, P 2 Ϫ P 1 ϭ 16.8%, 95% CI [Ϫ3.7%, 35.2%]. Thus, we were unable to replicate the results of Perillo and Kassin (2011) . However, whereas Perillo and Kassin (2011) documented a 0% false-confession rate in the no-bluff control condition, our no-bluff control condition produced a false confession rate of 23.7%. This dramatic difference in the baseline rate of false confessions muted the potential impact of the bluff manipulation, which produced comparable false confession rates of 40.5% in the current research versus 50% in Perillo and Kassin's (2011) study. Although both of our studies relied on a convenience sample of undergraduate college students, it is worth noting the geographic differences between our two study populations. The current research recruited students at a Midwestern university while Perillo and Kassin's (2011) students were recruited from a large university in New York City. This difference highlights the importance of conducting studies with participants in different geographic regions.
We had also predicted that the evidence-bluff would reduce pleas among the innocent relative to those in the no-bluff condition. Because the evidence-bluff theoretically strengthens the phenomenology of innocence such that the innocent believes they will be exonerated, they should be more resistant to the pressure to plea. Why accept punishment for something you did not do, especially if your innocence will be discovered? Unfortunately, the null impact of the evidence-bluff on plea decisions among the innocent renders any interpretations inconclusive. However, it could be that the strength of the innocents' innocence diminishes in a situation in which they are being offered a deal that essentially presumes their guilt. Plea offers could, therefore, force innocent defendants to face the possibility that they will be convicted more so than when they are asked to sign a confession. Thus, the very nature of a confession (as evidence) versus a plea (as conviction) could influence the strength of the phenomenology of innocence.
It is also possible that the alterations made to the evidence-bluff manipulation for the current research made it less effective than it was in Perillo and Kassin (2011) . More specifically, the addition of plea-bargaining conditions required that the evidence-bluff manipulation be modified to ensure that participants knew their acceptance of the plea would erase any chance of accessing the video. If participants in plea conditions felt that the video could still be accessed later, even if they signed the plea, it would reduce the ecological validity of the plea manipulation. In real-world cases, once a plea bargain is accepted, no further evidence is examined or discovered. Thus, the original evidence-bluff manipulation was altered to include additional information regarding the life span of the security video-participants were told that the security camera was set to a 24-hr loop. Participants in confession conditions were told that the professor was calling at that time to have the video saved regardless of their decision to confess or deny. Participants in plea conditions were told that the professor would only call to save the video if they chose to reject the plea. These alterations made the bluff story more complex than it was in Perillo and Kassin (2011) . The added complexity of the evidence-bluff could have impacted participants in unpredictable ways thereby concealing the predicted effects. Further, we cannot know for certain whether participants truly believed the security camera footage would be deleted if they signed the plea.
This ambiguity highlights an important issue in real-world plea negotiations. Although the Brady (discovery) rule requires that prosecutors inform defendants of evidence that could help their case, jurisdictions vary regarding when this evidence must be provided. There have been documented cases in which defendants were not granted access to potentially exonerating evidence until weeks or days before the trial. For instance, Aaron Cedres was charged with gang assault for his involvement in a fight that resulted in one man suffering a broken jaw (among other injuries; Schwartzapfel, 2017)-a charge that carried a possible sentence of 25 years in prison. Cedres claimed his involvement in the brawl was limited to separating two men. He was offered a plea that would carry a sentence for 5 years, but Cedres rejected the plea believing the security camera footage would corroborate his account. He and his lawyer held out for nearly 6 months when the requested footage finally appeared in his lawyer's inbox. As Cedres had claimed, the footage revealed that he had thrown two punches to release one man from a bear hug, and that the most severe injuries were suffered in a larger fight that broke out across the street. Yet, if Cedres had accepted the plea offered to him, this evidence would never have been turned over. This case occurred in New York, one of 10 states in which prosecutors are permitted to wait until just before trial to turn over key evidence-long after plea negotiations have occurred. While new regulations have been proposed and passed requiring prosecutors to turn key evidence over earlier, the application of discovery (Brady) rules during the plea process is still largely ambiguous and can vary dramatically by jurisdiction.
Pleas Versus Confessions
Despite the absence of the predicted interaction between the evidence-bluff and plea-confession manipulations on acceptance This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
outcomes, there is some evidence indicating that the factors impacting confessions are different from those impacting pleas. Specifically, participants' open-ended responses as to why they accepted or rejected the statement offered to them differed significantly by plea versus confession conditions. This analysis provides the best support (at least thus far) in favor of the distinction between psychological processes underlying the decision to confess versus the decision to plead. When participants were confronted with the decision to sign the statement presented to them, the primary factors they considered differed by whether the statement was a plea deal or a confession. When asked to confess, guilty participants often cited their own guilt as their reason for signing (52.0%). This finding is consistent with Houston et al.'s (2014) theory that true confessions are often internally motivated. In contrast, guilt was not the primary motivation behind true pleas; instead, the guilty often chose to plead because it was the easier alternative (42.4%), or because they feared the consequences of not signing (22.0%). These reasons seem more characteristic of external motivations or pressures. Thus, this pattern of results supports the supposition that true confessions are more internally motivated, while also revealing the possibility that true pleas (like false confessions) might be more externally motivated. Further, several individuals (innocent and guilty) reported that they chose to accept the plea deal because they were afraid of the consequences of not signing (11.8 and 22.0%, respectively), whereas no individuals (innocent or guilty) cited fear as their reason for signing the confession. Further, the increased number of questions asked by guilty individuals in the plea conditions indicates that their decision involved more factors than the decision to confess. Innocent individuals in both plea and confession conditions cited their own innocence as the predominant reason for refusing to sign the statement. However, the remaining innocent individuals who refused to accept the plea provided a greater variety of responses than innocent individuals who refused to confess. Most of the innocent individuals who refused to confess for reasons other than their own innocence cited the untrue nature of the accusation as their reason for refusal. It could also be argued post hoc, that these two responses are different ways of saying essentially the same thing. Both responses (e.g., I'm innocent, the accusation is false) relate to the participants' phenomenological knowledge of what actually occurred. Consequently, if the Untrue and Innocent categories were collapsed together, then all but three of the innocent people who refused to confess cited knowledge of their innocence as their reason for refusal. In contrast, 25.5% (12) of innocent individuals in plea conditions provided reasons other than their own innocence for choosing to reject the plea deal. In summary, it appears that one's guilt or innocence is often a salient factor in the decision to sign a confession. In contrast, the decision to plead is influenced more by weighing the actual alternatives provided by the offer itself.
These differences are consistent with the differences in plea versus confession decision models. The confession decision was driven primarily by short-term (or proximal) factors (e.g., guilt status) with less focus on the longer-term (or distal) consequences of confessing. In contrast, the decision to plea was driven more by the fear of alternative consequences. Thus, the decision to plead allows defendants to weigh two alternatives (a certain outcome vs. a probabilistic outcome), and determine which alternative produces the most utility; in contrast, the decision to confess is influenced by factors that change with the interrogation altering the associated utility of the proximal and distal consequences of confessing.
Contextual Differences in Decision-Making
The absence of the predicted interaction between the evidencebluff and plea-confession manipulations could be due, at least in part, to the study procedure. Perhaps cheating paradigms are best suited to the confession research for which they were originally designed. After all, these paradigms are largely "hot cognition" paradigms in which people are placed under considerable pressure and psychological discomfort in a confined room and are forced to make a decision within a short period of time. The cheating paradigm makes good sense for a confession because it mimics the situation under which people are treated during interrogations. Plea decisions, on the other hand, are typically made under conditions that might be considered "cold cognition." While recent research has indicated that time pressures have become more of a factor in plea decisions (Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 2016) , they still occur in states of "cooler" cognition than confession decisions. Plea offers are presented by prosecutors, sometimes through a defense attorney, at a time of relative calm in which the person has time (sometimes days) to think about the decision and explore the consequences. Had these cooler plea consideration conditions been used in the current study, we might have found the expected effect. Namely, the bluff might have reduced the chances that innocent people would accept a plea offer, because given more time to deliberate and cool down, people will better realize that accepting the plea undermines the pursuit of the very evidence that could prove their innocence.
The problem we encountered with testing the bluff hypothesis on pleas using a paradigm that would have mimicked the previously described differences is that it would have confounded the basic differences between confessions and pleas with other variables that vary in differing degrees. For instance, although defendants typically have more time to consider a plea offer than a confession statement, the size of this variation can differ widely, with some defendants getting days to consider a plea and others only getting hours. Hence, we chose to keep the conditions as similar to each other, as well as previous research, as possible for this initial examination of confessions versus pleas. In the long run, however, research will need to recognize the varying circumstances surrounding pleas and confessions, which cannot be entirely captured by relying on similar methodologies. Confessions are commonly secured in a highly charged, fast-moving, emotional, and isolated environment whereas pleas are typically offered with the ability to consult others, and with more time to make a decision. Indeed, these situational differences might be among the most important factors distinguishing the processes involved in confessions versus those involved in pleas. In that sense, a single paradigm for comparing confessions to pleas might have masked the very differences that we were trying to observe. Thus, future research should look for other paradigms that could better examine the differences between pleas and confessions by capturing more of the real-world contextual variations.
Should future plea research mimic key features of real-world plea situations such as delaying the plea offer to a later time (e.g., days later)? There are likely to be ethical issues associated with This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
such a paradigm. Leaving people in that level of stress for a period of days would be ethically questionable. There are other characteristics of pleas decisions in the real world, however, that might be incorporated with the cheating paradigm, such as the advice from a defense attorney. It should be noted, however, that plea negotiations do not necessarily involve a defense attorney. Defendants can decide to accept a plea without the advice of counsel, pro se. Also, even when there is advice from defense counsel, the final decision is always left to the defendant, and the defendant must stand up in court and publicly agree to the plea deal. It is also difficult to determine how readily results from the current research could be generalized to real-world cases with more severe punishments. Twenty hours of lab work cannot be easily compared with 20 years in prison. Unfortunately, this limitation cannot be easily overcome with the current paradigm. It would again be both difficult and ethically dubious to convince participants that they could face punishments as severe as a prison sentence. That said, most crimes come with minimal jail sentences and sometimes include no sentences at all. Such minor cases are much more common than the severe cases that would require years of prison. Minor cases are also much more likely to be resolved by plea than serious cases (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). Thus, although it is unclear how easily these results could be applied to more severe cases, they can be more readily applied to the less severe and more prevalent cases.
Conclusions
The current research offers some evidence that the psychological processes underlying the decision to plea are different from the psychological processes underlying the decision to confess. It also highlighted some of the potential issues with using similar paradigms for both plea and confession research. Although the results were not as clear as predicted, the reasons participants provided for signing a confession versus a plea deal could shed some light on the ways in which defendants approach these decisions differently. This research also provides further support that plea deals are not necessarily an effective tool for separating the innocent from the guilty. The current research found that plea acceptance increased the likelihood of guilt by only 1.81 times, and previous research has documented even lower diagnosticity ratios (Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Wilford & Wells, under revision) . Although we cannot claim that these ratios are representative of ratios in actual cases, the factors involved in the innocent's decision to accept pleas might very well be the same in the lab as they are in the real world (e.g., nearly 60% of the innocent participants who accepted pleas cited fear or pressure as their reason for doing so). Just because there are limits on the generalizability of lab research does not mean that the lab cannot mimic the real world in meaningful ways.
While the implications of this research might be limited, it at least provides a start to testing the assumptions on which the pervasive legal practice of plea-bargaining has been based. It is not possible to know what impact additional psycho-legal research could have on our future legal system. However, consider the rise in eyewitness research that began with seminal studies in the 1970s and 1980s. Over decades of research, social science has supported eyewitness procedures that reduce the probability of false eyewitness identifications (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014; Wells, 2014; Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2012) . Consequently, many jurisdictions have responded to research by reforming their eyewitness procedures (e.g., the states of Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Ohio along with other major cities and counties; Wells et al., 2000) . Perhaps 30 years from now, plea researchers can follow in the footsteps of eyewitness researchers and share in their success.
If social science researchers do not critically test the assumptions the legal system has made to justify plea-bargaining, reforms might never materialize. Without such reforms, people like Kerry Max Cook and Erma Faye Stewart will continue to pay not for their crimes, but for their decision to accept a plea. Kerry Max Cook has spent the majority of his life fighting for a declaration of actual innocence in the murder of Linda Jo Edwards-a declaration that has been denied despite typically exonerating DNA tests. Erma Faye Stewart will remain one of seven people saddled with drug charges in Hearne, TX after critical evidence was thrown out at trial (Bikel, 2004) . Hundreds of previously convicted murderers have been exonerated by DNA (Innocence Project, 2017) ; 20 other individuals facing the same charges as Stewart (with the same evidence) in Hearne, TX were never charged. Unfortunately, Kerry Max Cook was pressured into accepting a plea; Erma Faye Stewart and six others were pressured into accepting a plea. As a result, their charges stand. Perhaps it is too late to spare these individuals, but in a legal system inspired by the formulation that it is better that 10 guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer, perhaps it is time for the legal system to start rebalancing its priorities.
